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"NOT WILL, BUT JUDGMENT11*
JOHN MITCHELL

largely unnoticed in the press outside of Washington,
one of the vital controversies in American history reached a
dramatic high point three weeks ago in the nation's capital.
A

LTHOUGH

Chief Justice Warren Burger had been invited to give the main
address at the dedication of Georgetown University's new Law Center.
But a number of Georgetown law students were disturbed by a previous
remark of the Chief Justice to the effect that the elective and legislative
process, rather than litigation, should be regarded as the principal
avenue of social change. They organized their own counter-dedication
in the street outside the new Law Center, and for the main speaker they
invited William Kunstler, the activist attorney who had received several
sentences totaling over four years for contempt of court in the Chicago
Seven Trial
So, on September 17 we had two speeches at the same time and
almost at the same place-one by the nation's most eminent jurist and
the other by a self-proclaimed "anti-establishment" lawyer who is
among the most conspicuous exponents of activism in the courts. To
give you an idea of the tone of Mr. Kunstler's speech, the press quoted
him as having said, "Chief Justice Burger represents a vile system,
and speaks for a vile system. He is not fit to dedicate this law school..."
You can see that this whole situation was hardly calculated to
enhance the dignity of the highest court and the highest magistrate in
this land. Yet, far from being intimidated by this spectacle, the Chief
Justice chose as his theme the very issue that had apparently brought on
the counter-dedication in the first place.
On the earlier occasion, in a New York Times interview last July,
the Chief Justice had been asked whether law students were justified in
hoping they could accomplish "a change in the system through law."
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He had answered, in part:
I sincerely trust that some of their hopes
may be justified. .

.

.Young people who

decide to go into the law primarily on the
theory that they can change the world by
litigation in the courts I think may be in
for some disappointments. It is not the
right way to make the decision to go into
the law, and that is not the route by which
basic changes in a country like ours should
be made. That is a legislative and policy
process, part of the political process. And
there is a very limited role for the courts in
this respect.
It was apparently in response to this
statement that Mr. Kunstler-and again
I am referring to press accounts of the
counter-dedication--declared, "I think the
Chief Justice . ..is embarked on a program of destroying the new breed of lawyers as a force for social change."
With this kind of rhetoric on one side
of the issue, it is difficult to make any
rational comparison between the two viewpoints. But since the encounter is so arresting, it almost commands our attention
on one of the truly basic questions in our
governmental system. Many young people
are going into law because they anticipate using the courts to effect social change.
The question is, therefore, is this the best
channel that can be used by the energies
working for change?
In his Georgetown University address,
just as in his earlier press interview, Chief
Justice Burger did not say that the courts
should be avoided as an avenue of change.
He did say that "although the litigation
process is one factor in change, it is a slow,
painful and often clumsy instrument of
progress ... ." He pointed out that "Federal

judges in particular need not be troubled
by constituents or elections ... ." He asked
those who look to this source for change
"to ponder what remedy is available if the
world shaped by the judicial process is not
tw their liking." And he reminded them
that our history "began with a revolution
instituted to overthrow a government that
was beyond recall by the votes of the people."
In fact, belief in rule by the people was
so strong when the Constitution was originally formed that there was considerable
argument for making the Federal judiciary
an arm of the legislative branch. But the
framers of the Constitution kept it separate
as a check against the other two branches.
Writing in the Federalist papers, Alexander
Hamilton considered it to be the "least
dangerous" of the three branches, since it
"can take no active resolution" in the governing process. "It may truly be said," he
added, "to have neither force nor will, but
only judgment."
Since then there have been times when
many feared that Hamilton was wrong.
One who feared this declared:
The Court . . .has improperly set itself

up as a third House of Congress-a super
legislature . . . reading into the Constitu-

tion words and implications which are not
there, and which were never intended to be
there.
Who said that? Not one of today's conservatives protesting the court's opinion in
Miranda vs. Arizona or United States vs.
Wade. It was President Franklin D. Roosevelt, stung by a Supreme Court which had
declared key New Deal measures to be
unconstitutional-had, in his opinion, substituted will for judgment.
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I bring this up as a reminder that the
judiciary can and does work in either direction from one's own opinion and from
public opinion. Those who may be enchanted with the Court as an instrument of
change today would have opposed its actions
yesterday and might oppose them again
tomorrow. And the disenchantment can
turn to alarm if the judgment referred to by
Hamilton gives way to sheer will-the will
of activist attorneys before the bar, the will
of the judges themselves, or the will of another governmental branch trying to dominate the Court.
In retrospect, it is even more appalling
today than it was in 1937 that President
Roosevelt would attempt to destroy the
independence of the Supreme Court with
his court-packing scheme. In rejecting that
scheme, Congress championed at that time
just what Chief Justice Burger championed
in his Georgetown University speech. It
insisted on maintaining its own limitations
and it defended the powers of another
branch of Government. In reporting against
the court packing bill, the Senate Judiciary
Committee stated: "We are not the judges
of the judges. We are not above the Constitution."
In this same spirit, the Chief Justice is
saying today, in effect, "We cannot legislate
for the legislators. We are not above the
Constitution."
To some, it may seem strange for a man
who has gained such eminence through a
career in the courts to offer such a warning
about the courts. Yet history will testify
that such "judicial restraint"-the refusal
to substitute will for judgment-is precisely
the quality that most distinguishes a great
judge. Even Chief Justice John Marshall,
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who first effectively asserted the Supreme
Court's power to declare an act of Congress
unconstitutional, recognized that the true
power in this country is and should be in
the hands of the voters. "The people made
the Constitution," he wrote, "and the people can unmake it. It is the creature of
their own will, and lives only by their will."
You will recall that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was noted for approaching the
law more from a philosophical than a legalistic viewpoint. But he was appalled
when some of his colleagues seemed to
measure a law in question, not by the
Constitution, but by their personal leanings
... seemed to apply will and not judgment.
"I strongly believe," he wrote, "that my
agreement or disagreement has nothing to
do with the right of a majority to embody
their opinions in law."
All of this may sound na'fve to those who
cynically regard all of Government as a
raw power struggle, with no holds barred,
even if they do violence to the plan of
Government itself. When it comes to the
judiciary they hope to use it as, in Roosevelt's words, "a third House of Congress"
-but a House not responsible to the people. Such a superlegislature might accomplish short-term results. But when will is
thus substituted for judgment, neither the
champions of the right nor of the left can
benefit for long. What had seemed to be a
sophisticated exploitation of the machinery
of government would, in reality, turn the
clock back hundreds of years to a day
when the law was what the king said it was.
Certainly, it is true that the good fight
can be fought and won in the courts. They
have been the great bulwark against undue
assumption of power by another branch.
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They have provided an alternate mode for
relief of grievances at times when the more
active branches seemed stalemated.
Without trying to get the courts to remake the law, young activist attorneys already have worlds to conquer in using the
courts to enforce the law. Wrongs upon
the public in such areas as environmental
pollution, wrongs upon the individual in
such areas as consumer fraud-these offer
vast fields for plowing by those who commendably want to make their careers relevant to the needs of society. Let us
remember that the discovery of facts constitutes more than haif the practice of law.
To document injustice and to invoke the
law for the public good is no prideless portion of the human adventure.
And to work through law and the judicial
institution in this manner is infinitely preferable to the tragic alternative espoused by
some-to defy the law and destroy our
institutions. In a country which offers the
redress of the bench and the ballot, he is
no hero who resorts to the barricade.
Yet with all this, it is also true that the
courts are not constructed to carry the
mainstream of national change. They are
not intended to initiate, but only to respond.
What they may consider, and when they
may consider it, are limited by circumstances. Generally, they are to wait until a
specific case is brought under someone
else's law before they can perform what is
best described as, not an action, but a
reaction. And as they do this, their factfinding capability is not nearly so comprehensive as that of a legislative body.
This, then, is the "slow, painful and
often clumsy instrument of progress" to

which Chief Justice Burger referred. The
purpose of the judiciary is to provide a
detached and impartial judgment of legal
problems presented to the Court, not to
effectuate the people's will.
Finally, it is true that judges may in
many instances give us a more clear cut
decision than we can get from elected
legislators, who must reconcile conflicting
interests through compromise, or perhaps
even from an elected executive, who is also
mindful of varied interests and who must
work through the extended machinery of
government. But because of the need for
judicial independence, judges are the least
responsible to the people, and at the Federal level they are not responsible to the
people at all. Hence, if judges were to step
beyond judgment and substitute their will
for the people's will-as expressed through
the other branches-then we revert to some
form of government other than a democracy.
In fact, it is not through just one, but
through all three branches of government
that young lawyers can find opportunity to
effect change. All three branches have their
share-some would say more than their
share-of lawyers. In completing his answer to the New York Times interviewer,
the Chief Justice touched on this when he
said, "But if they see that as lawyers they
may exert great influence on the whole system, then they may not be disappointed."
I dare say that each of us may sometimes
feel the frustration that was observed by the
celebrated French traveler, Alexis DeTocqueville, who visited America in the
1830s. "The lawyers of the United States,"
he wrote, "form a party which is but little
feared and scarcely perceived . . . ." Yet
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listen to what he added: "But this party extends over the whole community ... it acts
upon the country imperceptibly, but it
finally fashions it to suit its own purposes."
Many of DeTocqueville's observations of
American life are found to hold good to
this day, but I do not believe that lawyers
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as a class could ever agree among themselves how to fashion the country. Yet if
only half of DeTocqueville's claim is true,
lawyers exercise far more power than any
other profession that young people could
enter. And I would charge those who eventually attain to the bench, that they use this
power, not with will, but with judgment.

